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Introduction 
As in other Western democracies, local party systems in Belgium not only comprise local 
branches of national parties but also independent local lists. These local lists undoubtedly give a 
distinct place-bound flavour to the local party systems, but not in an unequivocal manner. 
Scholars agree that the common denominator of local lists covers a highly varied content, yet 
scientific knowledge of the different manifestations of local lists and their differentiated 
consequences for local politics is lacking. Academic research on local lists generally takes a 
theoretical or quantitative perspective opposing local lists to national party-branches. However, 
this approach leaves little scope for empirical differentiation and qualitative nuance. Hence, 
Steyvers et al. (2009) proposed a theoretical classification model nuancing the supposed 
contradistinction between independent local lists and branches of national parties by 
differentiating local lists based on their actual independence of national parties and the extent to 
which they should be considered as partisan. Notwithstanding the theoretical value of this 
NAPA-model (nationalization-partisanship), its actual applicability for classification purposes is 
limited since measurable indicators are lacking.   
This paper is innovative in its aim to develop a practicable typology of local lists as an 
instrument for deepening our understanding of this multifarious local phenomenon. Proceeding 
from the NAPA-model and integrating a neo-institutional perspective, four institutionalization 
dimensions of local lists will be elaborated and concretized, resulting in a twofold 
institutionalization typology. The first part of this typology classifies local lists based on their 
decisional autonomy, while the second part considers the internal organizational characteristics 
of local lists. Subsequently, the practicability of this model is tested by applying it to a selection 
of ten Flemish local lists. A qualitative analyses of these cases, based on elite-interviews, 
allowed us to allocate them to a specific ideal-type in both parts of the institutionalization 
typology.  
Conceptualizing local lists 
1. Nationalization and Partisanship 
Independent local lists are a common and growing phenomenon in Western democracies. Still, 
empirical research on local lists is nascent and generally takes a quantitative perspective. In their 
aim to highlight the relevance of these local political actors, Reiser and Holtmann (2008) provide 
an overview of theoretical and empirical research on local lists in Europe. For comparative 
purposes, they suggests a minimal definition for local lists based on 2 criteria related to their 
local/national character: 1) their focus on one and only one local jurisdiction and 2) their 
(nominal) independency of national (or supra-local) parties. Although these (and other) authors 
are well aware of the vast internal variation concealed by this definition, methodological 
concerns impel them to deal with local lists as a homogenous category and contrast them to local 
divisions of national parties. This minimalist approach is valuable for developing and integrating 
elementary knowledge on local lists as an aggregation, but inhibits profound analysis of the 
internal differentiation within this broad category. Furthermore it neglects specific national 
contexts enabling specific manifestations of local lists.  
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Steyvers et al. (2008) similarly point to the assumed heterogeneity of local lists in a Belgian 
context and suggest conceptual refinement. In their NAPA-model (Nationalisation – 
Partisanship), they introduce two analytical dimensions to differentiate local lists (figure 1). The 
first dimension classifies local lists according to their actual - and not mere nominal - 
independence of national parties (nationalisation). Indeed, a local name can disguise more or less 
strong relations with a national party, as also suggested by Ackaert (2006, p 105-108). Steyvers 
et al. (2008) perceive the dichotomy between local lists and local branches of national parties as 
a continuum with genuine local lists and national party branches on the two far ends with several 
manifestations of pseudo-local phenomena in between. The second dimension introduced by the 
NAPA-model classifies local lists according to the degree to which they behave as political 
parties and fulfil the functions generally accorded to them (partisanship). Again the authors 
perceive a partisanship-continuum. On the one end we find local lists behaving as genuine local 
parties, thus serving as functional equivalents of national party branches. The other end situates 
local lists that merely apply a party-like form as electoral device to gain representative power 
without performing any societal functions (constituency of independents).  
Figure 1: NAPA-model for classifying local lists (Steyvers et Al., 2008) 
Notwithstanding the theoretical relevance of the dimensions introduced by the NAPA-model, it 
lacks appropriate indicators and empirical data to substantiate the underlying theoretical 
assumptions. Consequently, in what follows, we will further elaborate on the nationalization and 
partisanship dimension by relating them to the concept of institutionalization. 
2. Institutionalization 
Political institutionalization was first described by Samuel Huntington as  ‘the process by which 
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’ (Huntington, 1968, p.394). Since then 
several authors have used the concept of party institutionalization, generally focussing on 
national parties in a comparative perspective (Crotty, 1968, Janda, 1980; Panebianco, 1988; 
Levitsky, 1998) and more recently also on new democratizing countries (Levitsky, 2001; Randall 
& Svasand, 2002; Basedau & Stroh; 2008). Randal & Svasand (2002) critically explored existing 
literature on party institutionalization and identified the different dimensions considered in 
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literature. Thereupon, they suggested to understand institutionalization as “the process by which 
the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, 
or culture” (Randal & Svasand, 2002, 12), differentiating between a structural and an attitudinal 
component of party institutionalization. In addition, they distinguish between internal and 
externally related aspects of this concept. Based on these insights and from a democratizing 
perspective, Randal & Svasand propose the following analytical model, identifying four 
components of party institutionalization (Figure 2). 
 Internal External 
Structural  Systemness Decisional autonomy 
Attitudinal Value infusion Reification 
Figure 2: Dimensions of party institutionalisation (Randal & Svansand, 2002, p.13) 
Returning to the NAPA-model for classifying local lists and confronting it with the concept of 
party institutionalization reveals quite some common ground. Indeed, the nationalization 
dimension - or actual independence from national parties - can be related to decisional autonomy 
of  local lists, while the partisanship dimension can be related to the internal organizational 
components of institutionalization (systemness and value infusion). Consequently, the concept of 
party institutionalization proves valuable for analyzing and classifying  local lists. Hence, in 
what follows we will further on decisional autonomy, systemness and value infusion as relevant 
components of institutionalization of local lists and translate them into practicable indicators for 
classification purposes.  
3.  From nationalization to decisional autonomy 
Decisional autonomy as structural, external component of party institutionalization is defined by 
Randal & Svasand as ‘the freedom from interference in determining its own policies and 
strategies’ (Randal & Svansand, 2002, p.14). Applying this component to  local lists, decisional 
autonomy is relevant in two directions, which can be interpreted as vertical and horizontal 
autonomy. Vertical autonomy relates to the freedom of interference from national parties and is 
thus closely linked to the nationalization dimension of the NAPA-model. Horizontal autonomy 
on the other hand refers to the freedom of interference from other local political actors. This 
latter interpretation of decisional autonomy is especially relevant in a Belgian context where 
local cartels are a common phenomenon, equally restricting the decisional autonomy of local 
parties.   
3.1  Vertical autonomy 
Local lists are generally interpreted as independent local lists – thus neglecting the pseudo-local 
variants, while the presence of the latter is often implicitly recognized. Moreover, the presence of 
these local lists is an important argument in the academic discussion on nationalisation and party 
politicisation. Political scientists generally agree on a historic nationalisation tendency, referring 
to the increasing homogenisation of national politics in Western democracies (Caramani, 1996, 
2004). There is less academic agreement on the local implications of this nationalisation 
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tendency. Rokkan (1966) introduced the concept of party politicisation referring to ‘(the) 
breakdown of the traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organised 
parties into municipal elections’ (Rokkan in Kjaer & Elklit, 2010, p. 338). According to Rokkan, 
this party politicisation process would result in completely nationalized local party-systems, 
independent (non-partisan) elements being eliminated. Indeed, a number of studies give 
indications for a constantly increasing party politicisation of local politics (Bäck, 2003; Aars & 
Ringkjob, 2005; Kjaer & Elklit, 2009). However, other researchers contradict this absolute end-
state of politicisation by pointing to the recent revival of local lists in many European countries 
(Reiser & Holtmann (eds.), 2008). Also in Belgium national parties do play an important role in 
local politics, but no clear evidence could be found for a systematic nationalisation of the local 
party political offer and/or result, with local lists remaining an important feature of Belgian local 
party systems (Wille & Deschouwer, 2007). 
However, the assumption that local lists can conceal more or less strong links to national parties 
puts the academic discussion on party politicisation in another perspective, implying that the 
localist dimension of local politics actually tends to quasi-national practices. There is no 
evidence however on the prevalence of pseudo-local phenomena, but local lists as well as 
national parties can benefit from such links. National parties aspire maximum presence at the 
local level, because this provides them with valuable political resources, such as funding, activist 
recruitment, party image, media exposure, preservation of member loyalty and linkage to society 
(Pedahzur & Brichta in Kjaer & Elklit, 2009, p.340). Local lists then again could benefit from 
national support (financial, personnel, logistic, ...) in a competitive local environment with 
limited resources of their own (Heyerick & Steyvers, 2011). Notwithstanding these potential 
political benefits of linking local and national political actors, a local and independent profile can 
also be valued for several reasons. Marcel Boogers (2008) indicates four motives for taking an 
independent position 1) it allows a distinct focus on local issues; 2) the perceived irrelevance of 
national party politics for local issues and the interpretation of local politics as pragmatic and 
factual; 3) dissatisfaction with national party politics; and 4) independence of national political 
trends. We can add to this list more personal motives, often resulting from party-internal 
conflicts.  
While the NAPA-model differentiates between national, local and pseudo-local lists to reckon 
with the possible presence of more or less hidden links to national parties, we will further 
differentiate between local lists without any links to national parties, local lists with explicit links 
to national parties and local lists with implicit or partial links to national parties. To determine 
these links, we can refer to Bolleyer (2011) who analyzed the hierarchical elements in 
stratarchical parties. She considers central conflict resolution, central control over fiscal 
resources and top-down communication as principal connections between a party centre and its 
organizational units. This distinction between strategic, financial and logistic links between  
components of a political party is equally relevant for determining the presence of links between 
local lists and national parties.  
3.2  Horizontal autonomy 
A local list’s decisional autonomy could also be constrained by horizontal interference from 
other local actors.  This is especially the case in the Belgian context where the presence of local 
lists is to a certain extent attributed to the increased attractiveness of local cartel formulas 
induced by the fractionalisation of the party political offer, combined with the institutionally 
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embedded advantage for bigger political groupings (council seat distribution based on the 
Imperiali method) (Deschouwer, 1996). Verthé and Deschouwer (2011) use the term pre-
electoral alliances to refer to these “agreement[s] between parties to form a joint list or present 
joint candidates to the voters” (Verthé & Deschouwer, 2011, 4) and identify costs and benefits of 
these local cartels. They argue that parties opt for a pre-electoral alliance to reduce electoral risks 
and secure office or even survival (for small parties). This potential benefits however come with 
a considerable cost since a joint list implies renouncing individual recognisability as well as 
decisional autonomy. After all, joining forces for electoral purposes requires agreements on a 
variety of aspects (joint programmatic profile,  campaigning, candidate selection, list formation, 
cooperation,...) and consequently limits the decisional freedom of the partners involved.  
Considering the  horizontal autonomy of local lists, two categories of local lists can be 
distinguished: cartel lists and autonomous lists. Local cartel lists (or pre-electoral alliances) in 
which two or more local political actors join forces in a specific and time-bound electoral 
context. The respective cartel partners remain clearly discernible (thus differing from a merge) 
and agreements are made to determine the conditions of this cooperation. Autonomous local lists 
on the other hand face the voter individually under own power.  
3.3 Indicators 
We have thus disentangled decisional autonomy of local lists in horizontal and vertical 
autonomy. Determining the autonomous character of local lists requires measurable indicators. 
Two indicators have been selected for measuring vertical autonomy: 1) local or national 
name/list number and 2) presence of logistic, financial or strategic support from a national party.  
Horizontal autonomy is measured by the presence of a pre-electoral alliance. Table 1 outlines the 
criteria for allocating local lists to the respective categories on the two autonomy dimensions . 
Autonomy Indicators 
v
er
ti
ca
l 
 
Explicit 
- national list number and national (reference in) 
name  
  
- presence of logistic, financial and / or strategic 
support from a (or more) national party  
implicit 
(partial) 
- local list number and local (component in) 
name 
  
- presence of logistic, financial and / or strategic 
support from a (or more) national party  
None - local name and list number 
  
- absence of logistic, financial or strategic 
support from any national party 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
cartel list 
- local list representing a pre-electoral alliance 
between two or more groups of candidates 
autonomous list 
- local list representing an autonomous group of 
candidates 
Table 1: indicators for measuring decisional autonomy of local lists 
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4. From partisanship to systemness and coherence 
The NAPA model identifies partisanship as a crucial dimension for differentiating local lists. 
Partisanship is understood as “the extent to which a given list is fulfilling the functions that are 
usually associated with parties beyond serving as a mere constituency such as representative 
linkage, interest articulation, aggregation, collective goal formulation, socialisation, 
mobilisation, elite formation, recruitment and the organisation of government.” (Steyvers et al., 
2008, p.174). Thus, numerous functional aspects of party life are cited, however, without 
specifying clear criteria to determine a local list’s actual degree of partisanship. Indeed, 
analysing local lists’ degree of partisanship is a complex matter, as illustrated by the variety of 
perspectives assumed by scholars studying political parties. Generally, a particular focus on a 
specific aspect of political parties is assumed: their electorate, their functions, their governmental 
performances, their competitive behaviour, ... . Since Katz and Mair’s work on change and 
adaptation in party organizations in western democracies in 1994, a neo-institutional approach is 
regaining importance, considering parties as organizations, taking account of their formal as well 
as cultural organizational characteristics.  
We will also adopt this neo-institutional approach for understanding the partisanship character of 
local lists. Following Randall and Svasand (2008) partisanship is interpreted as the internal 
dimension of the institutionalization concept. These authors subdivide this internal dimension 
into systemness and value infusion. The former refers to the increasing scope, density and 
regularity of the interactions within the party, while the latter indicates the members’ 
identification with and commitment to the party. Basedau & Stroh (2008) built on these notions 
of systemness and value infusion, however defining them as level of organization and coherence. 
In the following we will refer to systemness and coherence as respectively the structural and the 
attitudinal component of the institutionalization characteristics of local lists. 
On both criteria two categories are distinguished: local lists with high or low systemness and 
local lists with strong or weak coherence. Systemness of local lists is interpreted as the presence 
of explicit formalized party organs with clear and differentiated competences.  Local lists with 
high systemness have differentiated party organs with separate competences and formal 
procedures to organise interactions between the party organs. Local lists with low systemness 
gather their people informally, without having formalized party organs with differentiated 
competences.  
The coherence of local lists concerns the sense of belonging of the group-members and the 
presence (or absence) of internal conflicts. Local lists with strong coherence demonstrate a deep 
sense of belonging: the persons involved have a common conception of the raison d’ètre of the 
local lists and strongly identify themselves with the common goal. Differences in opinion are 
accepted and debated and  decisions are generally taken in consensus. Local lists with weak 
coherence assemble a group of people with few common reference points besides individual 
interests, thus lacking a real sense of belonging.  Conflicts occur more regularly and conflict 
management is hierarchically organized. 
We have interpreted the partisanship character of local lists as the combination of two internal 
institutionalization components: systemness and coherence. Subsequently, we selected 4 
indicators to measure these criteria. The systemness of local lists is established by assessing the 
presence of 1) a formal membership structure and 2) a formal and regularly meeting board with 
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clear and differentiated competences. Coherence of local lists is measured by 1) the absence of 
conflicts and 2) the openness of the decision-making process. The criteria for allocating local 
lists to the respective categories of systemness and coherence are outlined in table 2. 
Partisanship Indicators 
sy
st
em
n
es
s 
High - presence of a formal paying membership structure 
  
- presence of a formal board with clear and 
differentiated competences, holding regular 
meetings.  
Low - absence of a formal paying membership structure 
  
- absence of a formal board with clear and 
differentiated competences, holding regular 
meetings.  
co
h
er
en
c
e
 
Strong - absence of conflicts 
  
- open culture of debate, differences in opinion are 
welcomed, group decisions are generally taken in 
consensus 
Weak - presence of conflicts 
  
- absence of debating culture, differences of opinion 
are suppressed and decisions are taken by the 
(office-holding) elite 
Table 2: Indicators to measure partisanship 
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Two models for classifying local lists. 
So far we have related the 2 NAPA-dimensions (Nationalization and Partisanship) to the concept 
of party institutionalization and disentangled them into 4 criteria relevant for classifying local 
lists: vertical autonomy, horizontal autonomy, systemness and coherence. Combining all four 
criteria in one classification model is inexpedient and would impede analytical clarity. However 
the institutionalization criteria can be combined in pairs, resulting in a dual institutionalization 
typology. The first part of this typology is based on local lists’ decisional autonomy and takes 
account of vertical as well as horizontal autonomy, while the second part is based on the 
organizational party-characteristics of local lists, combining systemness and coherence.  
Autonomy 
vertical 
explicit 
implicit 
(partial) 
None 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
cartel list 
party 
cartel 
localized 
cartel 
local cartel 
autonomous 
list 
national 
party 
branch 
supported 
local list 
independent 
local list 
Figure 3: autonomy model for classifying  local lists. 
Partisanship 
systemness 
high low 
co
h
er
en
c
e
 
strong local party local group 
weak 
dispersed local 
party 
constituency of 
independents 
Figure 4: Partisanship model for classifying  local lists. 
The autonomy model (figure 3) identifies three types of local cartel lists and three types of 
autonomous local lists, varying in their level of autonomy towards national party politics. A 
party cartel is a pre-electoral alliance between two or more local branches of national parties. 
The respective links between the cartel partners and national parties are explicit and reflected in 
the name of the cartel list. In a localized cartel, the links to national parties are less obvious, 
because they are implicit or only partial. These cartel lists have a local component in their 
composition and/or name. A local cartel is a absolute local variant of a pre-electoral alliance. 
The respective partners have no links at all to any national party.  
In the category of autonomous list, independent local lists are those local lists without any links 
to a national party, while a supported local list has implicit strategic, financial or logistic links to 
a national party, which are not visible at first sight and concealed by a local name. A national 
party branch at last has obvious or explicit links to a national party, also reflected in its name. 
10 
 
The partisanship model (figure 4) identifies 4 types of local lists. A local party is characterized 
by high systemness and strong coherence. The operation of the party is well structured with 
clearly differentiated party organs and competences. The persons involved have a common local 
project and strongly identify with the list. A dispersed local party has similar structural 
characteristics, but internal cohesion is weak. Candidates have little common reference points 
besides individual interests. A local group demonstrates low systemness - lacking a formal 
division of labour – but high coherence with a strong sense of belonging. This is reflected in the 
organizational culture with conflicts being rare, differences in opinion openly debated and 
decisions generally taken in consensus. A constituency of independents to end with is a local list 
displaying low systemness and weak coherence. These local lists serve as vehicle for individual 
political ambitions. It concerns a motley mishmash of people with no mutual coherence or shared 
vision on local politics. Beyond elections times, representatives of the list focus on their own 
mandate, with no interaction between the candidates .   
Applying the autonomy and partisanship model 
1. Methods 
The two classification models developed above and the corresponding typologies were 
developed as a practicable tool for classifying local lists. Its analitical relevance therefore 
depends on their actual classification capabilities. In this section we will test the practicability of 
the autonomy and partisanship model for classifying local lists by measuring the relevant 
characteristics of a selection of cases in order to allocate them into the respective typologies.  
Ten local lists were arbitrarily selected and qualitatively analyzed, based on elite-interviews. 
Since our main focus concerns independent local lists, we restricted the selection to local lists 
which participated in the 2006 local elections under a local name and non-national list-number, 
thus neglecting the local party branches. However, we included one local lists that did participate 
under a national list-number, but with a customized name. The electronic election database of the 
Flemish Agency for Internal Affairs responsible for the organisation of the elections Information, 
offers information on the local name and list number of  candidate lists. This database 
demonstrates that more than 300 lists participated in Flanders in the 2006 local elections under a 
non-national list-number. For convenience reasons the selection of cases was restricted the 
selection to the provinces of East-Flanders and Antwerp. 
The following ten local lists were selected:  
local list municipality 
ABC (Anders, Beter, Concreter) Lovendegem 
DENERT Kruibeke 
GLIM (Goed Leven in Malle) Malle 
GPS (Groen Progressie Stekene) Stekene 
KLIK (Kalken en Laarne In de 
Kijker) Laarne 
MORTIER Merelbeke 
SAMBA (Samen Betrouwbaar Zwalm 
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Actief) 
SP.A Samen voor Deinze Deinze 
VLD-CDO-GROEN! Mechelen 
ZAP (Zottegems alternatieve Ploeg) Zottegem 
 
For each case we then selected the person most suited for an in-depth interview on the 4 
organizational criteria of the institutionalization model. We aimed for respondents with an 
overall and in-depth view on the origins and developments of the respective lists, which in most 
cases was the person who headed the list of candidates in 2006.  
A first round of interviews was conducted by the end of 2010, a second round in the second half 
of 2011, resulting in more than 16 hours of audio material. All the interviews were then 
transcribed and analysed qualitatively with the software programme NVivo to determine the 
relevant characteristics of the cases and allocate them into the institutionalization typologies. The 
analysis will be illustrated with citations from the interviews
1
.  
However measuring internal partisanship characteristics of cartel lists poses a methodological 
difficulty,  because systemness and coherence are individual organisational criteria. Distinct 
cartel partners can demonstrate varying degrees of internal institutionalization. Consequently, the 
analysis of systemness and coherence focuses on individual cartel partners in case of local cartel 
lists. Only the cartel partner interviewed is thus taken into account.  
2. Measuring institutionalization criteria 
2.1 Horizontal autonomy 
Of the ten analyzed cases, two can be defined as local cartel lists: SAMBA in Zottegem en VLD-
CDO-GROEN! in Mechelen. Both cases mention office-seeking motivations for choosing for 
this cooperation strategy. SAMBA is an electoral platform uniting four local branches of national 
parties who were at that time in opposition. Their common purpose was to offer an alternative 
for the established governing party. VLD - CDO – GROEN! concerns a local cartel in Mechelen 
combining two local branches of national parties complemented with some independent 
representatives. Their common goal was to continue the preceding governmental combination.  
“I gathered people from CD&V (Christian-Democrat party), SP.A (Socialist party), 
Groen! (Green party) and also some from N-VA (the Flemish-Nationalist party) and after 
two months we had a complete election programme with those four parties” (SAMBA) 
“The idea was to make a city list with the resigning mayor and aldermen […] The 
message was: we govern the city today and we want to govern it tomorrow. “ (VLD-
CDO-GROEN!) 
The other eight cases can be defined as autonomous lists since they have faced the voter under 
own steam in the 2006 election. Remarkably however, five of them (GPS, GLIM, SP.A Samen 
voor Deinze, ZAP and ABC) have considered previously or are considering now to form a local 
cartel. The most cited motivation is the desire to rupture the established majority. However also 
                                                          
1
 De quotes were slightly reformulated to increase readability without changing the content. 
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disadvantages are considered such as difficulties for candidate selection and the electoral risk of 
losing its own identity.  
‘From a simple mathematical point of view we cannot exclude talking to the SP.A.  For in 
politics 2+2 is five, so we might then be able to join a majority …” (GPS) 
“Preparing the 2006 elections, the idea came up to form a cartel because for decades 
now our communality has been ruled by Christian-democrats […] and liberals […] 
Initially it looked like we would form a list with all parties except for the governing ones, 
but some of them then dropped out.” (SP.A Samen voor deinze) 
2.2 Vertical autonomy 
Since the selection of cases was based on the local list’s non-national list number, the analysis 
concentrated on detecting implicit or partial links to a national party. The case selection included 
one deviant case of a local list that did face the voter under a national list-number thus having 
explicit links to a national party, however with localized name. SP.A Samen voor Deinze (SP.A 
together for deinze) is indeed a local branch of the national socialist party (SP.A), while the local 
modification of the party’s name reflects its efforts to integrate independent actors on the list. 
The party branch felt compelled to look beyond their own midst since they experienced 
difficulties to fill a complete candidate lists autonomously.  
“In the past we always faced the voter as a branch of SP.A, but it wasn’t easy to compose 
a complete list […]. We like having independents on our list: people whom we cannot 
reach otherwise, nor their voters. We also like having action committees on our list.” 
(SPA Samen voor Deinze) 
Three of the analyzed cases have partial or implicit links with one (or more) national parties. The 
two cartels mentioned in the section above concern pre-electoral alliances between several party 
branches, complemented with some independents. The uncommon combination of party-
branches as well as the involvement of independents reflects the place-bound context of these 
alliances. This local aspect is emphasized by adopting a local component in the cartel list’s 
name, illustrative for the implicit or partial links to national party politics. Although the name 
VLD-CDO-Groen! explicitly refers to the two national parties involved (VLD and Groen), the 
two dissident Christian Democratic aldermen of CDO (Independent Christian Democrats) 
represent the local component, also weakening the links to national party politics. In the case of 
SAMBA, the links to national party politics cannot be directly inferred from the local list’s 
name. However, it has always been clear for inhabitants/voters and (local) media which four 
parties were involved in this cartel list.  
GPS is the only autonomous list in the selection of cases demonstrating implicit links to a 
national party. It used to be a local branch of the national Green party but prior to the 2006 
elections, they adopted a local name aiming to attract independent candidates and voters. This 
localisation did not prevent them though from maintaining informal ties with their former 
national mother party. They kept relying on the national green party for logistic support in terms 
of capacity building and financing of printed matter. 
“Our list is local, but the national party is like a rich aunt.” (GPS) 
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Six of the 10 analyzed cases have no links at all to any national party. They assume a local and 
independent disposition and point out various substantive, strategic and personal motives for this 
choice, such as the perceived irrelevance of traditional national cleavages, the desire to act 
autonomously (not being accountable to a national party), the preference for factual politics 
(local politicians addressing local problems close to the people) and personal rancour resulting 
from conflicts in other local parties. 
 “Local politics means governing based on factual knowledge […] by local people who 
are familiar with the problems, while national politics occurs above the heads.”  
(DENERT) 
"the emphasis on not being attached to any party was important to us […] because party 
ideologies are not very relevant for a communality as Lovendegem”  (ABC) 
2.3 Systemness 
The analyses reveals four cases demonstrating high systemness of which the two analyzed cartel 
partners (Open VLD Mechelen and SP.A Zwalm). Also SP.A Samen voor Deinze  and GLIM 
demonstrate high systemness with a formal membership structure and formal party organs with 
clearly defined roles.  
“Each party in the cartel - or at least two – has its own separate branch committee, 
representatives,  board members and members paying membership fees” (Open VLD 
Mechelen) 
“ We have 165 paying members of which 16 are active in the executive board and several 
in our associations” (SP.A Samen voor Deinze) 
 “ We had a president, a secretary, a treasurer, an executive committee gathering each 
month and a general assembly were we got feed-back from different wings” (GLIM) 
The six remaining lists in our sample demonstrate low systemness. Some of them have no party 
structures at all, while others do report having some official party organs, however without 
specified competences. In practice the different organs and their competences are not clearly 
differentiated, thus having no obvious relevance in organizing the local list’s division of labour.  
“ We have never used the word ‘party’. […] A party suggests having members and 
membership cards, we did not have all that […], we were just some people, having that 
idea and meeting regularly”(ABC) 
 “ We have an official board, a president, a treasurer, but no general assembly, we are a 
factual association. […] The board does not meet separately: this actually coincides with 
the group meetings, we work in a  very transparent way and everybody is included.” 
(KLIK) 
2.4 Coherence 
Analyzing coherence of the selected lists reveals some methodological difficulties. This criterion 
refers to the attitudinal or cultural aspects of the organization, which is more difficult to measure. 
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We defined the presence of conflicts and the openness of the decision-making process as 
indicators to measure local list’s coherence. The presence of conflicts indeed seems a relevant 
indication for weak coherence, however the absence of conflicts does not necessarily indicate 
high coherence. 3 cases demonstrate absence of conflicts, but a very closed decision-making 
process. MORTIER is a one-man’s list consisting of only one person and thus by definition 
without conflicts, while DENERT and Open VLD Mechelen (cartel partner in VLD-CDO-
Groen) are also rather personal lists, established to support the incumbent mayor. In both cases 
the mayor takes most decisions. The other candidates on the list mainly serve to support the 
mayor and his idea’s. Conflicts are rare in these cases because the authority of the mayor is 
undisputed. It can be questioned if this lack of conflict is to be attributed to actual coherence in 
the group or rather the absence of a common goal and identity. Following Randall & Svasand 
who interpret value infusion as transcending instrumental incentives, we interpret these cases as 
having weak coherence. 
“Bart is the mayor, he decides everything. He was also the one who negotiated the 
majority.”   (Open VLD Mechelen)  
“The list will disappear with me […].We are not a party, but a group of people […] 
meaning the best for me and the communality.” (DENERT) 
SP.A Zottegem and SP.A Samen voor Deinze also demonstrate weak coherence, reporting severe 
internal conflicts. The involvement of supra-local party instances for conflict mediation indicates 
the absence or the failure of a consensus seeking culture. Additionally, the list SP.A Samen voor 
Deinze includes several independents, formally refusing to identify with the raison d’ètre of that 
party and thus also indicative for low coherence.  
“We had so much disagreement here, the situation was really blocked. The national party 
then send someone to solve things.” (SP.A Samen voor Deinze) 
The five remaining local lists demonstrate a strong coherence. The activists strongly identify 
with the list and its project. They form a close group, with strong social ties. Conflicts are rare, 
while differences in opinion are not resisted but openly discussed with the aim of consensus 
building. 
“We are very transparent, without secrets […] We never vote, but we always reach a 
consensus while everybody can overtly express himself” (KLIK) 
“The way we work, the enthusiasm, the dedication is tangible: to give one example, we 
issue a magazine every year and nobody has ever felt the need to profile himself or 
criticize another.” (MASSART) 
This coherence of local lists proves the most difficult dimension to measure. The absence of 
conflicts is an insufficient indicator for determining strong coherence, although the presence of 
conflicts offers a valuable indication for weak coherence. The openness of the decision making 
culture seems to offer a better indication for measuring weak and strong coherence, however 
without considering the potentially strong, but intangible influence of strong individuals in the 
group. 
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2.4 Identifying types of local lists  
The analysis of the cases and their qualification on the four criteria allows us to allocate them 
into the autonomy and partisanship typology, as illustrated in figure 5.  
Applying the autonomy model reveals that the selection of cases consists of one national party 
branch, two localized cartels, one supported local list and six independent local list. No party 
cartels or local cartels occur in the selection. 
Autonomy 
vertical 
explicit 
implicit 
(partial) 
none 
h
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l 
cartel list 
party cartel: 
localized 
cartel: 
local cartel: 
 / 
SAMBA, VLD-
CDO-GROEN 
 / 
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list 
national party 
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local list: 
independent 
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voor Deinze 
GPS 
ABC, Denert,  
KLIK, GLIM,  
MORTIER, 
ZAP  
Figure 5: The autonomy model applied on the case selection 
The partisanship model provides us with one local party, three dispersed local parties, four local 
groups and two constituencies of independents (figure 6). 
Partisanship 
systemness 
high low 
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strong 
local party: local group: 
GLIM  ABC, GPS, KLIK, ZAP 
weak 
Dispersed local party: 
constituency of 
independents: 
SP.A Samen voor 
Deinze, SP.A 
(Zottegem), Open VLD 
(Mechelen) 
Denert, Mortier 
Figure 6: The partisanship model applied on the case selection 
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Conclusions 
Examining the political phenomenon of local lists in first instance raises more questions than 
answers since the common denominator of local lists conceals an enormous internal variety. 
Consequently, developing in-depth academic understanding of local lists and their consequences 
for local politics requires relevant classification models to refine the broad concept of local lists 
allowing qualitative differentiation. In this paper we have developed such a classification model 
using a neo-institutional perspective.  The party institutionalization concept was disentangled in 
its distinct components and adapted to the context of local lists. Four relevant criteria for 
classifying local lists were determined: vertical autonomy, horizontal autonomy, systemness and 
coherence. Consequently, for each dimension we defined relevant indicators and mutually 
excluding categories. These institutionalization criteria were then coupled in related pairs 
resulting in two middle-range typologies for classifying local lists. The autonomy model 
classifies local lists based on the links they have with other local and/or national political actors. 
The partisanship model is based on structural and cultural internal organizational aspects of local 
lists (systemness and coherence). 
A qualitative analysis of a limited selection of ten local lists allowed us to assess the relevant 
characteristics of the cases and to allocate each case unambiguously to a specific type of local list 
in the two typologies. This exercise confirmed the practicability and relevance of the two 
models. The restricted selection of cases does not permit conclusions about the relations between 
the two typologies, however we can assume that most independent local lists have lower 
systemness than local lists with links to a national party(ies). Where the latter can adopt the 
organizational model of the related national party, no clear-cut template is available to 
independent local lists for organizing and structuring internal action and interaction. Furthermore 
we did only consider the systemness and coherence of individual cartel partners within a cartel 
lists, while it might also be interesting to reflect on the systemness and coherence of cartel lists in 
its totality.  
Since the selection of cases is by no means representative no inferences can be made on the 
incidents of specific types of local lists. Quantitative research is needed to map the geographical 
dispersion of different types of local lists. Furthermore qualitative research is needed for 
clarifying the occurrence of these types as well as the dynamics. Our research suggests  that 
horizontal autonomy of local lists is a very flexible dimension. With every upcoming election, 
local lists seem to consider the opportunities of a cartel formula. 
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